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Abstract
This papers studies the impact of a financial transactions tax on the trading
volume and asset price volatility in a model with heterogeneous beliefs. To model
heterogeneous beliefs we follow Kurz (1994, 1997) and restrict the class of beliefs
to the subset of rational beliefs. We study a tax on bond and asset purchases.
The simulated model shows that the introduction of a transaction tax results in a
lower trading volume and therefore in less liquid financial markets. Because of the
decreased liquidity the volatility of the stock market increases. We also study the
welfare effects of a financial transaction tax and the simulation results also show
that there is only a small change in welfare.
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1 Introduction
The recent banking and financial crisis has reignited the public debate about a financial
transactions tax as proposed by Keynes (1936) for the stock market or Tobin (1978,
1996) for the foreign-exchange market. The proponents of a financial transaction tax
claim that a financial transaction would reduce ’harmful’ speculation, reduce the volatil-
ity of asset prices and it would generate considerable tax revenues for the government
or supranational institutions. Whereas opponents of a transaction tax argue that it would
increase the cost of capital, lead to illiquid markets, and distorts portfolio and capital
structure decisions1.
Recently the European Commission proposed the introduction of a financial transac-
tion tax in the European Union. This transaction tax is supposed to be levied on stocks,
bonds and derivatives. One objective of this transaction tax is “creating appropriate dis-
incentives for transactions that do not enhance the efficiency of financial markets thereby
complementing regulatory measures to avoid future crises.”2, i.e. reducing speculative
trades and improving financial market stability.
Opponents of a transaction tax argue that the high trading volume observable on
financial markets does not cause price volatility and is in fact stabilizing (Friedman
(1953)). They argue that the introduction of a transaction tax would lower liquidity and
therefore trades do have a larger impact on prices which in turn implies that the volatility
increases. Thus, from the point of view of opponents, a financial transaction tax would
actually destabilize financial markets.
1An overview of the debate is given by the surveys of Habermeier and Kirilenko (2003) and McCul-
loch and Pacillo (2011).
2see the press release of the European Commission from 28/09/2011, available at http://europa.
eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-1085_en.htm. Another stated objective of the proposed
tax is to generate tax revenue, although even proponents of a transaction tax such as Tobin argue that tax
revenue should not be a key objective of such a tax.
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In contrast to the view of the opponents, proponents of a financial transacion tax
argue that “in the absence of any consensus on fundamentals the markets are dominated
... by traders in the game of guessing what other traders are going to think” (Tobin
(1978) p. 158). Or, to put it in other words most traders on financial markets are not
interested in long-term investing and do not buy assets by looking at the ’fundamental
value’ but participate in a Keynesian beauty contest and hope to make profits by cor-
rectly predicting the actions of other traders which in turn causes excessive volatility of
prices.
There is little disagreement in the literature that heterogeneous beliefs increases the
trading volume (see e.g. Harris and Raviv (1993) or Scheinkman and Xiong (2003))
and price volatility (see e.g. Harrison and Kreps (1978), Kurz et al. (2005a), Kurz and
Motolese (2011), Basak (2005)). In models with heterogeneous beliefs, the true value of
assets are unknown and traders act according to their beliefs while taking the beliefs of
other traders into account. This resembles the argument made by proponents of a trans-
action tax on the causes of volatility. This might lead one to believe that the introduction
of a transaction tax in an economy with heterogeneous beliefs reduces trading volume
and price volatility, however reducing market liquidity might offset the reduced volatil-
ity from reduced speculative trade and actually increase the market volatility. Thus,
ex-ante it is not clear whether a financial transaction tax increases or decreases price
volatility.
In this paper we study the implications of a financial transaction tax on the stock
and bond market for asset price volatility and welfare in an asset pricing model with
heterogeneous beliefs. We restrict the beliefs to be rational beliefs in the sense of Kurz
(1994, 1997) which requires the beliefs to be compatible with the empirical data. This
rationality requirement is weaker than the one for rational expectations. Rational ex-
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pectations requires the households to know the true probabilities in the economy while
in an economy with rational beliefs households only know the empirical distribution. If
the households also believe that the economy is not stationary, then households’ beliefs
might not converge. Hence, households might disagree.3
The simulation results show that a financial transaction tax has ambiguous effect on
the volatility of asset prices and interest rates. In general, transaction taxes on different
markets have the same qualitative results in the sense that the introduction of a tax
on either market pushes the volatility of stocks into the same direction. However the
taxes have different quantitative effects in the sense that the magnitude of the change is
different. This quantitative differences stem from the different restriction on the agents’
behavior taxes on different markets have. In particular, a transaction tax on the stock
market impedes the ability of the agents to buy or sell stocks. Whereas a transaction
tax on the bond impedes the ability of the agents to finance asset purchases or to save
money from selling stocks.
If the true probability distribution is unknown, as it is standard in models with het-
erogeneous beliefs, the standard approach fails to measure economic welfare as they
would be measured under the subjective beliefs of the agents which are wrong. Under
the rational beliefs principle however, the agents agree upon the empirical distribution
of prices and dividends and it has been proposed by Nielsen (2004) to use the empirical
distribution to measure welfare. We follow his approach and find that the introduction
of a transaction tax can have positive welfare effects. Under rational beliefs an agent
will make large losses if he bets in the wrong direction. A transaction tax prevents the
agent to make such costly mistakes and reduces his losses and thus increases welfare.
3The argument that non-stationarity leads to possible disagreements among agents has also been made
by Lehrer and Smorodinsky (1996).
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There have been several studies on the impact of transaction taxes and transaction
costs on stock markets. In a static model Hara (2012) shows that transaction costs
have the adverse effect of an increasing trading volume whereas Subrahmanyan (1996)
studies the impact of transaction taxes in a model with asymmetric information and
argues that with competitive traders the trading volume declines.
Our model differs from noise trader models such as Song and Zhang (2005), Xu
(2010) or Lendvai et al. (2013). In models with noise traders a subset of trader can have
arbitrarily beliefs, whereas in our model the rational beliefs principle restricts the beliefs
to a subset of beliefs. Buss et al. (2013) study how various regulatory measures affect
stock market volatility. However, in their paper the difference of opinion stems from
the fact that the agents in the economy overrate the value of a public signal whereas
in our paper the source of heterogeneity is the restricted learnability of the underlying
stochastic process.
The rest of this paper is structured as folows. In section 2 we discuss the model and
the transaction tax, section 3 defines rational beliefs and explains the simulation model.
Section 4 discusses the impact of the financial transaction tax on market volatility and
in Section 5 studies the impact of beliefs on the efficacy of transaction taxes. In section
6 we discuss the welfare effects of financial transaction taxes and section 7 concludes
the paper.
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2 The Model
There are two representative households in the economy. Given his belief Qjt , a house-
holds selects portfolios and consumption plans to solve the problem
max
cjt ,θ
j
t ,θ
j
0,t
EQjt
[ ∞∑
s=t
βs−t
1
1− γ
(
cjs
)1−γ |Ht] (1)
With β as the subjective discount factor of the household, cjt as the consumption of
household j ∈ {1, 2} at time t and Ht as the history of prices and dividends at time t.
The holdings of agent j in the risky asset is denoted by θjt and the one in the risk-free
bond is denoted by θj0,t. The risky-asset has a net-supply of 1, while the bond is in zero
net-supply.
Furthermore, as in Burnside (1998) we assume that the empirical process of the
log-dividends follows an AR(1)-process of the form:
xt+1 = (1− λ)x∗ + λxxt + ρxt+1, ρxt+1 ∼ N (0, σx) (2)
and dt = ext . It should be kept in mind that equation (2) is what the agents in the
economy observe empirically. Under the rational beliefs principle the observed process
does not have to be the true process.
In this model trading on financial markets is subject to a transaction tax. The trans-
action tax is levied on the value traded in a market in period t. Following Heaton and
Lucas (1996) and Subrahmanyan (1996) we assume that the tax-base of the transaction-
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tax is quadratic. In particular, we have
taxSt =
τS
2
(
qtθ
j
t − qtθjt−1
)2
, (3)
taxBt =
τB
2
(
qbtθ
j
0,t
)2
, (4)
with τS and τB representing the tax-level and qt the price of the risky asset and qbt the
price of the bond. The quadratic form of the tax-base stems from several reasons. First,
it is to avoid subsidy on selling stocks or bonds. Second, a quadratic transaction tax
also captures the effect that with higher taxes it will be more difficult to find a trading
partner for large blocks of shares and thus the trader incurs some extra costs in finding
a trading partner.
One should note that there is a difference between the tax on asset purchases and
the tax on bond purchases. The tax on the stock market is a transaction tax on the
secondary market, because the asset is long-lived and the sale and purchase of the stock
on the secondary market is taxed. On the other hand, the transaction tax on the bond
market is a tax on the primary market.
Matheson (2011) reports that transaction taxes on bond market are usuallly levied
on the primary market and not on the secondary market. However, the newly proposed
transaction tax by the European Commission is a tax on the secondary market for bonds
as well. A transaction tax for bonds on the secondary market would take the following
form:
taxBt =
τB
2
(
qbtθ
j
0,t − θj0,t−1
)2
(5)
As most transaction taxes on bonds are on the primary market and not on the secondary
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market, we will use (4) and not (5) for our simulation study.
Additionally we assume that the revenues from the transaction tax are not redis-
tributed among the households, i.e. the administrative costs to collect taxes eat up the
whole income from taxation. Given the transaction tax, the budget constraint of the
household is now given by
cjt + θ
j
t qt + θ
j
0,tq
b
t + tax
S
t + tax
B
t = e
j
t + θ
j
t−1(vt + qt) + θ
j
0,t−1. (6)
with ejt as the households’ income in period t.
The euler equations for stock and bondholdings are therefore:
(
cjt
)−γ (
qt + τ
S(qt)
2(θjt − θjt−1)
)
= βEQjt
[(
cjt+1
)−γ (
qt+1 + dt+1 + τ
S(qt+1)
2(θjt+1 − θjt )
) |Ht] ,(
cjt
)−γ (
qbt + τ
B(qbt )
2(θj0,t)
)
= βEQjt
[(
cjt+1
)−γ |Ht] .
The bond and the stock-market are cleared for all t = 1, 2, 3... with the following equi-
librium conditions:
θ1t + θ
2
t = 1, (7)
θ10,t + θ
2
0,t = 0. (8)
3 Rational Beliefs
We are now turning to the discussion of the structure of beliefs. Instead of modelling
the learning process we follow Kurz et al. (2005a,b) and assume that the beliefs are part
of the economic primitives. Although this assumption seems to be inferior compared to
models with learning it has been argued by Jouini and Napp (2007) that in models with
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learning the beliefs are not ’more endogeneous’ because of the separability of learning
and the optimization problem of the agent. Thus assuming that beliefs are exogeneous
is not as restrictive as it might seem at first glance.
3.1 Individual Beliefs and the Market State of Belief
To study the rational beliefs we will introduce three different types of beliefs:
1. gjt denotes the state of belief of j as known only by the agent.
2. zt = (z1t , z
2
t ) denotes the market state of belief. While the market state of belief is
publicly observable, the model consistency condition is not recognized by agent
j.
3. zjt+1 = (z
j1
t+1, z
j2
t+1) is the forecast of agent j of the market state of belief at the
future date t+ 1.
Let the usual state space of agent j consist of endogeneous and exogeneous variables
be sj . Here we extend the state-space by adding an additional state-variable, called the
the agent j state of belief generated by agent j. It represents his date t subjective view of
date t+ 1 and is denoted by gjt ∈ Gj . With this variable we can express the conditional
probably as P (sjt+1, g
j
t+1|sjt , gjt ). Furthermore, gjt is privately perceived by agent j. We
assume that gjt follows a process of the form
gjt+1 = λzg
j
t + λ
zj
x (xt − x∗) + ρ˜g
j
t+1 , ρ˜
gj
t+1 ∼ N(0, σ˜2gj) (9)
The variable gjt can be interpreted as an assessment variable as in Kurz and Schneider
(1996) and it can be shown that the assessment variable fully pins down the conditional
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beliefs. For example, an agent could believe that the empirical distribution is the true
distribution. In this case the variable gjt has to be constant. This implies not only ρ˜g
j
has zero variance but also that λgjx , λgj and g
j
t are all zero. The random variable ρ˜
gj
t can
be correlated across agents which reflects some communication among agents (see e.g.
Nakata (2007)).
In equilibrium, asset prices depend on the distribution of beliefs. Similar to the
assumption that a competitive firm cannot affect prices, we assume that agents cannot
affect endogeneous variables, i.e. they take prices and their beliefs as given.
We are now discussing how agents in the model forecast prices. First, we define
the ’market state of belief’ as a vector zt = (z1t , z
2
t ). The model consistency condition
zt = gt is not recognized by the agents. With the prices in the economy depending now
on the market state of belief we add additional uncertainty to the economy. If the usual
state-variables are denoted by st, we can define a price-map as follows: qt
qbt
 = Φ(st, z1t , z2t ). (10)
However, with prices depending on the market-state of belief we get another impli-
cation of the extended market state of belief. To forecast the prices in the economy,
households also have to forecast the market state of belief in the economy. And al-
though all households use (10) to forecast prices, forecasts will be different because the
forecast of (st+1, z1t+1, z
2
t+1) will depend on his own state of belief g
j
t .
Because of the observability of zt we augment the empirical distribution of the div-
idends with the market states of belief. We assume that the empirical distribution is an
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AR-process of the form
xt+1 = (1− λx)x∗ + λxxt + ρxt+1 (11)
z1t+1 = λz1z
1
t + λ
z1
x (xt − x∗) + ρz
1
t+1 (12)
z2t+1 = λz2z
2
t + λ
z2
x (xt − x∗) + ρz
2
t+1 (13)
ρxt+1
ρz
1
t+1
ρz
2
t+1
 ∼ N

0,
0,
0,

σ2x, 0, 0
0, 1, σz1z2
0, σz1z2 , 1
 = Σ
 , i.i.d (14)
We rewrite (11),(12) and (13) in a more compact notation, i.e. let wt = (xt−x∗, z1t , z2t ),
ρt = (ρ
x
t , ρ
z1
t , ρ
z2
t ) and denote by A the 3 × 3 matrix of (11),(12) and (13). Thus, we
have
wt+1 = Awt + ρt+1 , ρt+1 ∼ N(0,Σ). (15)
The unconditional covariance of w is denoted by V = E(ww′) and it is computed
as the solution of the equation
V = AV A′ +Σ. (16)
3.2 General Structure of Beliefs
We first define the perception model of an agent. The transition functions representing
the households’ conditional probability belief is the perception model. Thus, to deter-
mine the households forecasts the perception model is used. The households’ beliefs
can deviate from the empirical distribution which can be interpreted as overconfidence
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of the households.
We denote the date t+1 variables as perceived by agent j aswjt+1 = (x
j
t+1, z
1j
t+1, z
2j
t+1)
and Γ is the stationary measure implied by (11)-(13). We also have Ψt+1(g
j
t+1), a three-
dimensional vector of date t+ 1 random variables conditional upon ght .
Definition 1. A perception model in the economy under study has the general form
wjt+1 = Awt + Ψt+1(g
j
t ), (17)
together with (11)-(13). Since EΓ [wt+1|Ht] = Awt, we can write (17) as follows
wjt+1 − EΓ [wt+1|Ht] = Ψt+1(gjt ). (18)
There is documented evidence in the psychological literature that people exhibit
overconfidence (see e.g. Larwood and Whittaker (1977), Svenson (1981), or Alicke
(1985)). In our model households can be overconfident in the sense that their subjec-
tive beliefs deviate from the empirical probabilities. This in contrast to overconfidence
models such as Daniel et al. (2001) which assume agents believe a public signal contains
more information than it actually does. Ψ(gjt ) is modelled by using a random variable
ηjt+1(g
j
t ):
Ψt+1(g
j
t ) =

λxgη
j
t+1(g
j
t ) + ρ˜
xj
t+1
λz1g η
j
t+1(g
j
t ) + ρ˜
zj1
t+1
λz2g η
j
t+1(g
j
t ) + ρ˜
zj12
t+1
 , ρ˜jt+1 ∼ N(0,Ωjρρ). (19)
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We can now express the perception model of agent j as follows:
xjt+1 = (1− λx)x∗ + λxxt + λxgηjt+1(gjt ) + ρ˜x
j
t+1, (20)
zj1t+1 = λzz
1
t + λ
z
x(xt − x∗) + λz1g ηjt+1(gjt ) + ρ˜z
j1
t+1, (21)
zj2t+1 = λzz
2
t + λ
z
x(xt − x∗) + λz2g ηjt+1(gjt ) + ρ˜z
j12
t+1 , (22)
gjt+1 = λzg
j
t + λ
z
x(xt − x∗) + ρ˜g
j
t+1. (23)
And ρ˜jt+1 = (ρ˜
xj
t+1, ρ˜
zj1
t+1, ρ˜
zj12
t+1 , ρ˜
j
t+1) is i.i.d. Normal with mean zero. Let Ωwgj =
(cov(ρ˜x
j
t+1, ρ˜
gj
t+1), cov(ρ˜
zj1
t+1, ρ˜
gj
t+1), cov(ρ˜
zj12
t+1 , ρ˜
gj
t+1)), then the covariance matrix Ω
j is given
by
Ωj =
 Ωjρρ, Ω>wgj
Ωwgj , σ
2
gj
 . (24)
We are now turning to the description of the random variable ηjt+1(g
j
t ). We define
ηjt+1(g
j
t ) as follows:
p(ηjt+1|gjt ) =
 φ1(g
j
t )f(η
j
t+1) if η
j
t+1 ≥ a
φ2(g
j
t )f(η
j
t+1) if η
j
t+1 < a
, (25)
with ηjt+1 and ρ˜
gj
t+1 are independent and f(η) = [1/
√
2pi]e−
η2
2 . The functions (φ1, φ2)
are then defined as follows:
φ(gj) =
1
1 + eb(gj−a)
, and define G ≡ Egφ(gj), (26)
φ1(g
j) =
φ(gj)
G
, φ2(g
j) = 2− φ1(gj). (27)
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The parameter b measures the intensity of fat tails. Fat tails in the empirical distribution
of returns have been attributed to resolve the equity premium puzzle (Rietz (1988),
Barro (2006)) and have also been documented empirically (see e.g. Fama (1963) or
Fama (1965)). While in models with rare events fat tails of the return distribution are
exogeneously given they arise endogeneously in our model because of the beliefs of
the agents. Furthermore, the parameter a denotes the asymmetry of the distribution of
beliefs, i.e. if a = 0 the beliefs are symmetric and if a 6= 0 the beliefs are asymmetric.
Given our description above, we can define bull and bear states as follows
Definition 2. Let Qj be the probability belief of agent j. Then gjt is said to be
a bear state for agent j if EQj [x
j
t+1|gjt , Ht] < EΓ (xt+1|Ht);
a bull state for agent j if EQj [x
j
t+1|gjt , Ht] > EΓ (xt+1|Ht).
3.3 Restriction of Beliefs
First, we define the implications of Rational Beliefs in the context of our simulation
model:
Definition 3. A perception model as defined in (18) is a Rational Belief if the agent’s
model wjt+1 = Awt + Ψt+1(g
j
t ) has the same empirical distribution as wt+1 = Awt +
ρt+1.
The interpretation of this definition is straightforward, i.e. although the conditional
expectations of an agent might be different from the empirical distribution, in the long
run his beliefs cannot be arbitrary. Thus, the rational beliefs principle implies that the
parameters determining the beliefs have to be restricted. The following Theorem due to
Kurz et al. (2005a,b) gives us these restrictions on the beliefs:
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Theorem 1. Let the beliefs of an agent be a Rational Belief. Then the belief is restricted
as follows:
(i) For any vector of parameters (λxg , λ
z
g, b) the Variance-Covariance matrix Ω
j is
fully defined and not subject to choice.
(ii) The condition that Ωj is a positive definite matrix establishes a feasibility region
for the vector (λxg , λ
z
g, b). In particular, it requires |λxg | ≤ σx,|λzg| ≤ 1.
(iii) Ψt+1(g
j
t ) cannot exhibit serial correlation and this restriction pins down the vec-
tor
Ωwgj = [cov(ρ˜
x
t+1, ρ˜
gj
t+1), cov(ρ˜
z1
t+1, ρ˜
gj
t+1), cov(ρ˜
z2
t+1, ρ˜
gj
t+1)]
4 Numerical Results
4.1 Calibration
To set the parameters for the simulation we follow Kurz et al. (2005a) and set the param-
eters of the perception model as close as possible to maximum value as implied by the
rationality conditions. For the dividend process, we set x∗ = 0.01773 and λx = −0.117
and σx = 0.03256. This calibration of the empirical dividend process is consistent with
the one used by Mehra and Prescott (1985). For the preferences of the households we
set β = 0.96 and γ = 2. Furthermore, households’ income ejt will be constant to 3. Set-
ting the income constant means that households trade only because of the differences in
beliefs but not because of risk-sharing.
In the non-stochastic steady-state the portfolio holdings of the agents are indetermi-
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Economic Fundamentals
x∗ σx λx β γ
0.01773 0.03256 -0.117 0.96 2
Beliefs
λxg λ
z
g λ
z
x b a σz1z2 λz
Economy I -0.027 0.200 0.900 -6 -0.25 0.9 0.7
Economy II 0.027 -0.200 0.900 -6 -0.25 0.9 0.7
Table 1: The parameters of the economic fundamentals and the beliefs of the agents.
nate, because stocks and bond are perfect substitutes at the non-stochastic steady state.
Additionally it has been shown for example by Kubler and Schmedders (2011) that the
wealth distribution affects asset prices in a non-trivial way. Hence we would like to
minimize the impact the initial wealth distribution of the agents has on volatility. Thus
for the steady-state holdings of the risky asset both agents hold half the tree and no
agent has debts, i.e. θj = 0.5 and θj0 = 0. Here we have dropped the time-subscripts
to indicate that these are the values in the steady state. To ensure that the transversal-
ity conditions hold we use a penalty function. The penalty functions are of the form
τpen,b
2
(θj0,t)
2 and τ
pen
2
(θjt − 0.5)2 and we set τ pen,b = τ pen = 0.005.
We also consider two different economies for the simulation studies, referred to as
Economy I and Economy II. For the first economy, we set λxg = −0.027 and λzg = 0.200
and in Economy II we set λxg = 0.027 and λ
z
g = −0.200. Furthermore, the parameter
b is set to b = −6, the parameter a to a = −0.25 and we set λzx = 0.9. Finally, the
correlation of beliefs σz1z2 is set to 0.9. All parameters are summarized in table 1.
Because of Definition 2 the difference between the two economies is the frequency
of bull and bear states. Bear states are more frequent in Economy I, whereas in Economy
II bull states are more frequent.
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For the simulation study the tax on bonds and stocks are in the range of 0% and 1%
and taxes are increased by 5 basis points. This range of taxes is in line with most ex-
isting transaction taxes. Furthermore, the transaction tax on stocks or bonds are usually
different.
An important aspect of our study is the trading volume in the economy and we
will use the trading volume as a proxy for liquidity on the market, i.e. a lower trading
volume implies a less liquid market.4 The trading volume in the stock and bond market
is defined as follows5:
V =
1
T
T∑
t=1
|θjt − θjt−1|, (28)
V b =
1
T
T∑
t=1
|θj0,t|. (29)
The economy is approximated using a second order perturbation using the software
pertsolve by Jin (2003).
4.2 Transaction Tax on Stocks
First, we are studying the impact of a financial transaction tax on the trading volume in
the stock market. The main results are as follows:
Summary of Results 1. The introduction of a transaction tax reduces the trading vol-
ume in stocks and bonds, whereas for the volatility of the Price/Dividend-ratio and
interest rates we have the following:
4Although the trading volume is only a crude measure for liquidity other liquidity measures based on
the market microstructure literature imply a positive relation ship between the trading volume and the
liquidity of financial markets. Furthermore, empirical studies on the impact of transaction taxes typically
focus on the trading volume.
5see Lo and Wang (2010) for various definitions of trading volumes
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(a) Trading Volume on the Stock Market (b) Trading Volume on the Bond Market
(c) Volatility of the P/D-ratio (d) Volatility of the Interest Rate
Figure 1: Effects of a Financial Transaction Tax on the Stock Market on Trading Volume
and Volatility
• The volatility of the Price/Dividend-ratio increases in Economy I and is nearly
unaffected in Economy II;
• The volatility of the interest rates decreases in Economy I and increases in Econ-
omy II.
In figure 1(a))we see that in both economies, the trading volume on the stock mar-
ket decreases with the transaction tax. However, the difference between these two
economies is how much a transaction tax results in a decline of the trading volume. For
Economy I, the trading volume reduces by about 60% with a tax of 1%. On the other
hand in Economy II trading volume decreases only by about 40% with a 1% transaction
tax.
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The impact of the financial transaction tax on the bond market is shown in figure
1(b). Again, the trading volume in the stock and the bond market declines for both
economies. Also, the reduction in trading volume is larger for Economy I than for
Economy II. The larger reduction in the trading volume for Economy I comes from the
fact that the agents in this model are more often pessimistic, i.e. they expect that the
returns on holding the risky asset are lower than the empirical returns. Define the returns
on buying the asset in period t and receiving dividends and selling it in period t + 1 as
rt =
vt+1+qt+1−(qt)−2c
qt+c
and let c be the transaction costs the agents face for trading. For
the sake of the argument keep the price qt fixed and the differences in the optimistic and
pessimistic economy is the expected dividend vt+1. Now we see that in the pessimistic
economy increasing the transaction tax has a larger effect on the expected returns than
in the optimistic economy. Hence, the trading volume in Economy I drops more than in
Economy II.
Thus, a transaction tax reduces the trading volume in both markets. Which in turn
implies that there is no substitution across assets. It is also different to the argument
by Heaton and Lucas (1996) who argue that transaction costs on one market affects the
trading on the other market as agents shift their attention to the market without taxes.6
The volatility of the Price-Dividend Ratio is shown in figure 1(c). And one can see
that there are now significant differences between the two economies. In Economy I,
the volatility increases whereas in Economy II the volatility decreases. Furthermore,
the size of the effect is also different, as the volatility in Economy I increases by more
than 0.2% with a transaction tax of 1%. Whereas the volatility in Economy II is nearly
unaffected.
6A similar point has been made by Levine and Zame (2002) who argue that for the case of CRRA-
utility it is possible to achieve the pareto-optimal allocation in an economy with only a risk-free asset.
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The change in volatility in this model has two sources. The first source is the ’spec-
ulative’ effect, i.e. trading volume and volatility are higher because of differences in
beliefs and a transaction tax would reduce volatility. The second effect is the liquidity
effect, i.e. a reduction in trading volume increases volatility and a transaction tax that
reduces trading volume would increase volatility. In a model with heterogeneous beliefs
this two effects affect the volatility in two different directions. In Economy I, the liquid-
ity effect dominates and thus the volatility increases whereas in Economy II both effects
are of the same strength and thus cancel each other out and the volatility is unaffected.
This result is also in contrast to the result by Heaton and Lucas (1996) who had no
significant effect on the price volatility with transaction costs only on the stock market
because with a tax on only one market the households will almost exclusively trade in
one market. However, in our model households withdraw from trading in both markets.
On the other hand, figure 1(d) shows that in Economy II the volatility of the interest
increases with a transaction tax whereas the volatility of the interest rate decreases with
the transaction tax. Furthermore, the effect of the transaction tax on the bond market
is also much stronger than on the stock market. In particular, the volatility declines by
about 10% in Economy I and increases by about 15% in Economy II.
Volatility on the bond market is also affected by the speculation and the liquidity
effect. In contrast to the stock market the effects are reversed, i.e. in Economy I the
introduction of a transaction tax reduces interest rate volatility and in Economy II the
volatility of the interest rate increases.
The decrease in trading volume and the simultaneous increase in volatility in Econ-
omy I is qualitative similar to empirical results. Empirical estimations of the elasticity
of trading volume with transaction costs on stock markets varies from 0 (Hu (1998)) to
−1.7 (Lindgren and Westlund (1990)). With an elasticity of −1 meaning that if trans-
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action costs increase by 50% the trading volume has to decrease by 50% as well. Thus,
our model produces a reduction in trading volume which is consistent with the empirical
evidence. Furthermore, the observed change in the volatility is within the empirically
observed range. While Hu (1998) finds that transaction costs do not affect volatility
Hau (2006) observes that increasing the tick size on the french stock market increases
transaction costs by 20% and volatility by 30%.
4.3 Transaction Tax on Bonds
We are now turning to the discussion of the impact of a financial transaction tax on the
bond market and we have the following resultss:
Summary of Results 2. A transaction tax on the bond market results in a decreasing
trading volume, whereas for the volatility of the price/dividend-ratio and the interest
rates we have:
• The volatility of the price/dividend-ratio increases in Economy I and decreases in
Economy II;
• The volatility of the interest-rate decreases in Economy I and increases in Econ-
omy I.
As opposed to the transaction tax on the equity market, a transaction tax on the bond
market has the same quantitative effect on the trading volume in Economy I and Econ-
omy II. In particular, the trading volume on the stock and bond market decreases with
the transaction tax (figures 2(a) and 2(b)). Additionally, a transaction tax on the bond
market affects the trading volume in both economies equally, i.e. in both economies and
both markets the trading volume is reduced by about 60% with a 1% transaction tax.
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(a) Trading Volume on the Stock Market (b) Trading Volume on the Bond Market
(c) Volatility of the Price/Dividend Ratio (d) Volatility of the Interest Rate
Figure 2: Effects of a Transaction Tax on the Bond Market on Trading Volume and
Volatility
We also see in figures 2(c) and 2(d) that the introduction of a transaction tax on the
bond market has qualitative similar effects as a transaction tax on the stock market. The
differences lies in the quantitative effects on the volatility. In particular the change in the
volatility of the Price/Dividend-Ratio and the interest rates is larger with the transaction
tax on the bond market. For example in Economy I, the volatility of the Price/Dividend-
Ratio increases by about 0.15% with a 1% transaction tax on the stock market whereas
it increases about 0.3% with a 1% transaction tax on the bond market.
These differences stem from the fact that agents decisions are restricted differently
by different taxes. A transaction tax on the bond market affects the ability of the agents
to borrow money to purchase the stock by changing the post-tax interest rate of the
households. A household that wants to save money faces now a lower interest rate
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whereas a household that wants to borrow money faces a higher interest rate. Thus the
higher the tax the higher the spread between the post-tax interest rates of borrowers and
lenders.
Consider for example that the economy is hit by a positive shock, i.e. agents gets
more optimistic. In the Economy I, the economy in which households are bearish more
than 50% of the time, the intensity of optimism is higher than in Economy II. Now,
with a transaction tax on the bond market the expected price of the risky asset has to
rise even stronger to satisfy the Euler-equations. On the other hand the impact of a
negative shock is less pronounced, because the distribution of beliefs in Economy II
is less skewed than the distribution in Economy I. Hence, the volatility increases in
Economy I and decreases in Economy II.
4.4 Simultaneous Transaction Tax on Stocks and Bonds
So far, the discussion was only about the cases in which a transaction tax was on one
market. Now, we are turning to the case in which a transaction tax is on both markets,
i.e. the stock and the bond market. The key results of this exercise are as follows:
Summary of Results 3. The introduction of a transaction tax on the stock market and
the bond market has the following effects:
1. A transaction tax on any market always reduces the trading volume.
2. In Economy I a transaction tax on the stock market does not reduce the volatility
in the economy.
3. In Economy II a transaction tax on the bond market always reduces the volatil-
ity of the P/D-Ratio whereas a transaction tax on the stock market only reduces
23
(a) Trading Volume on the Stock
Market in Economy I
(b) Trading Volume on the Bond
Market in Economy I
(c) Trading Volume on the Stock
Market in Economy II
(d) Trading Volume on the Bond
Market in Economy II
Figure 3: Trading Volume on the Stock and Bond Market in Economy I and Economy
II
the volatility of the P/D-Ratio if there is a transaction tax on the bond market.
Furthermore, the volatility of the interest does not always decrease.
Figure 3(a)) shows the trading volume on the stock market in Economy I. While we
still have a small decrease and an increase later on in the stock market, if we increase
the transaction tax on equities, the increase becomes smaller if the transaction tax on
bonds is increased. In addition, the trading volume on the bond market decreases with
an increase in the transction tax on the bond market, regardless of the transaction tax on
the stock market. Furthermore, the trading volume increases with the transaction tax on
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(a) Volatility of the P/D Ratio in
Economy I
(b) Volatility of the Interest Rate in
Economy I
(c) Volatility of the P/D Ratio in
Economy II
(d) Volatility of the Interest Rate in
Economy II
Figure 4: Volatility of the Price/Dividend Ratio and Interest Rate in Economy I and
Economy II
equity regardless of the transaction tax on bonds. A similar pattern can be seen for the
trading volume on the bond market (see figures 3(b)).
We now look at the volatility on the stock and the bond market. In Economy I, the
volatility of the stock market increases with a transction tax on the stock or bond market
(figure 4(a)) whereas in Economy II the volatility of the P/D-Ratio is nearly unaffected
by a transaction tax on the stock market, regardless of the transaction tax on the bond
market.
While the volatility of the interest rate in Economy I declines with the transaction
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tax on the stock or bond market (figure 4(b)) this is not case for Economy II. As long as
there is no transaction tax on the stock market, the volatility of the interest rate increases
with the tax on the bond market. If, on the other hand the tax on the stock market is
1% then the volatility of the interest rate declines with the tax on the bond market (see
figure 4(d))
5 Comparative Statics: Beliefs and the Effects of Trans-
action Taxes
Thus far, we have seen that the introduction of a transaction tax has ambiguous effects
on market volatility, i.e. the volatility can go up or down depending whether the liquid-
ity effect or the speculative effect dominates. Thus we are now investigating how the
volatility depends on the parameters for the beliefs.
5.1 Transaction Tax on the Stock Market
In figures 5 and 6 the impact of the different belief parameters on the volatility of the
Price/Dividend-Ratio are shown. The key result of this exercise are as follows:
Summary of Results 4. A change in the beliefs parameters (a, b, λzg, λxg) has the fol-
lowing effects on the volatility of the P/D-ratio:
1. In Economy I the volatility of the P/D ratio changes monotonically with the pa-
rameters (a, λzg, λ
x
g) and non-monotonically with the parameter b.
2. in Economy II no parameter has a monotonic effect on the volatility of the P/D-
ratio.
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(a) Changes in a and the P/D-Ratio (b) Changes in b and the P/D-Ratio
(c) Changes in λgx and the P/D-Ratio (d) Changes in λ
g
z and the P/D-Ratio
Figure 5: Price-Dividend Ratio under different parameters for beliefs in Economy I
In figures 5(a) and 6(a) we graph the volatility of the P/D-ratio under different pa-
rameters for a. For Economy I we can see a monotonic pattern, i.e. the change in
the volatility is largest for a = −0.05 wheras it is smallest for for a = −0.4. While
for Economy II, the increase in volatility is the largest when a = −0.05 Thus for an
economy with a more asymmetric belief distribution than the baseline economy we see
that the change in volatility is smaller than the change in the volatility of the baseline
economy. For an economy with a distribution of beliefs which is close to a symmetric
distribution the liquidity effect of the transaction tax becomes stronger. On the other
hand, for an economy with a very asymmetric distribution it cannot be concluded that
the speculative effect of a transaction tax becomes more dominant.
The volatility of the P/D-ration under different parameters for b is shown in figures
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(a) Changes in a and the P/D-Ratio (b) Changes in b and the P/D-Ratio
(c) Changes in λgx and the P/D-Ratio (d) Changes in λ
g
z and the P/D-Ratio
Figure 6: Price-Dividend Ratio under different parameters for beliefs in Economy II
5(b) and 6(b). In both economies a change in the intensity of the fat tails has a non-
monotonic effect on the volatility. A very low b means that the households’ beliefs
have large fat tails thus gives the households more incentive to speculate on a favorable
outcome. In an economy where bullish expectations are rare, the households could gain
a lot from the dividends. Whereas in an economy in which bearish expectations are
rare households will have an incentive to sell the stock to not get hit by a crash. As the
net-supply of the stock is positive the equilibrium price has to adjust. In particular it has
to become smaller so that the agents will hold the asset, hence the volatility increases.
From equations (20)-(22) it can bee seen that the parameters (λxg , λ
z
g) also measures
the intensity of the distribution, hence there is some substitution between the parameter
b and (λxg , λ
z
g). Which in turn implies a similar interpretation of the effects of a change
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of λxg on the volatility.
(a) Changes in a and the P/D-Ratio (b) Changes in b and the P/D-Ratio
(c) Changes in λgx and the P/D-Ratio (d) Changes in λ
g
z and the P/D-Ratio
Figure 7: Price-Dividend Ratio under different parameters for beliefs in Economy I
5.2 Transaction Tax on the Bond Market
We are now studying the relationship between a financial transaction tax on the bond
market and beliefs. The graphs for Economy I and Economy II are shown in figures 7
and 8. We have the following the key results
Summary of Results 5. For the changes in the beliefs parameters (a, b, λzg, λxg) the
volatility of the P/D ratio changes monotonically in Economy I and Economy II with a
change in (a, λzg, λ
x
g) and non-monotonically with b.
From figures 7(a),(c), (d) and 8(a),(c), (d) it can be seen that the effects of a change
in parameters are antisymmetric (a) or symmetric (λgx, λ
z
g). For the parameter a we
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(a) Changes in a and the P/D-Ratio (b) Changes in b and the P/D-Ratio
(c) Changes in λgx and the P/D-Ratio (d) Changes in λ
g
z and the P/D-Ratio
Figure 8: Price-Dividend Ratio under different parameters for beliefs in Economy II
see that in Economy I the change in volatility declines and in Economy II the change
in volatility increases. Hence implying that with a large asymmetry in the distribution
of beliefs a transaction tax has less effects on the volatility of the P/D-ratio. Similar
conclusion can be drawn for the parameters (λgx, λ
z
g), i.e. with a less persistent personal
state of belief (measured by λgx) or forecast about the market state of belief (measured
by λzg) the less is the P/D-ratio affected by a transaction tax on the bond market.
The only exception is the parameter b, although there is some substitutability be-
tween b and (λgx, λ
z
g), the changes are not monotonic. In particular large fat tails gives
the households an incentive to trade because of the gains that can be made from those
trades. As only the access to the bond market is restricted but not the access to the stock
market, a household in Economy I can still buy the stock if he foregoes consumption to
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buy the stock. Which in turn means that the transaction tax on the bond market has less
impact on equilibrium prices in the presence of fat tails.
6 Welfare Effects of a Financial Transaction Tax
So far, we have only discussed the impact of a financial transaction tax on the volatil-
ity in the economy but left out whether the introduction of a financial transaction tax
improves the welfare or not.
6.1 Measuring the Economic Welfare under Heterogeneous Beliefs
To measure the impact of a financial transaction tax on welfare we use an ex-post wel-
fare measure, because under heterogeneous beliefs households do not know the true
probability distribution in the economy and hence do hold incorrect beliefs. This rules
out the standard criterion, which is an ex-ante criterion. In particular, the welfare under
the ex-ante measure would be measured as follows:
V = EQh
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt
(
(cjt)
1−γ
1− γ
)]
, (30)
i.e. the welfare would be measured under the households’ subjective beliefs which
might be different from the true probabilities. Thus, this measure doesn’t give us an
accurate picture of the welfare effects of a financial transaction tax.7
In this paper we use the ex-post welfare optimum as introduced by Hammond (1981)
7The recent interest in models with heterogeneous beliefs has lead to some research how welfare
could be measured under heterogeneous beliefs. Other proposals for welfare measures are given by
Brunnermeier et al. (2012), Gilboa and Schmeidler (2012) and Blume et al. (2013).
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in which the outcome is evaluated under the planners probability distribution and not the
beliefs of the individual agent. And although nobody in the economy knows the true
probability distribution they agree on the empirical distribution. Thus, we follow the
argument by Nielsen (2009) and use the stationary measure as for all other distribu-
tions their will be no agreement among the households. Hence, the ex-post welfare of
household j is given by
V = EΓ
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt
(
(cjt)
1−γ
1− γ
)]
. (31)
To calculate the welfare we simulate 1000 times 600 years of the economy and
discard the first 100 years for every simulation.
6.2 The Welfare Effects of a Financial Transaction Tax
The welfare effects of a financial transaction tax can be summarized as follows:
Summary of Results 6. The introduction of a financial transaction tax has the follow-
ing effects on welfare:
1. The change in welfare is very small (< |0.01|%).
2. A financial transaction tax improves the welfare in Economy I.
3. A transaction tax on the stock market reduces the welfare in Economy II whereas
a transaction tax on the bond market does not affect welfare.
Figures 9(a) and 9(b) show the welfare effects of a financial transaction tax in Econ-
omy I and Economy II and we can clearly see that the introduction of a financial trans-
action tax always improves the welfare in the economy.
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(a) Change in Welfare in Economy
I
(b) Change in Welfare in Economy
II
Figure 9: Welfare in Economy I and Economy II
The reason that the introduction of a financial transaction tax improves the welfare
in Economy I is that the households now trade less on the financial markets. If they now
trade less they will make less mistakes, i.e. because of their overconfidence they might
assign a higher probability to a positive dividend compared to the empirical distribution
and hence end up buying too many assets. If the economy ends up now in a state with a
low dividend payout the households lose. Thus, preventing households from trading on
the stock market improves the welfare.
In Economy II a transaction tax on the bond market does not affect the welfare in
the economy while a transaction tax on the stock market decreases the welfare in the
economy, because the interest in the economy increases. That means that households
face now a higher risk in the economy for transfering wealth across time.
The reason for the small welfare effects of a financial transaction tax on welfare
is that only 15% of the households income comes from the financial market. Even if
a transaction tax reduces the wrong trades of the households, it only affects a small
proportion of the income. Hence the small effects on welfare.
33
6.3 Implications for Public Policy
Thus far, we have seen that the introduction of a financial transaction tax on the stock
market does not necessarily reduce the stock-market volatility. In fact, depending on the
structure of beliefs of the households, a financial transaction tax on the stock market or
bond market can have the adverse effect of increasing the stock market volatility. The
downside of the result is however that the structure of beliefs is not observable. Hence,
a policy maker who tries to introduce a transaction tax on the stock market does not
know ex-ante whether such a policy will increase or decrease the volatility on financial
markets.
Additionally, a policymaker might be thinking about introducing a transaction tax
on both markets. However, the effects of a transaction tax on both markets are similar to
a transaction tax on one market. Thus, whether the volatility is increased or decreased
depends on the structure of beliefs.
In Economy I the introduction of a transaction tax always had positive welfare ef-
fects and the structure of beliefs in this economy, i.e. short waves of intense opti-
mism and long waves of moderate pessimism is supported by the observations made
by Shilling (1992). Hence, one could argue that although a transaction tax might not
stabilize financial markets or prevent potential bubbles it still increases the welfare be-
cause of the reduced trade in the economy. And although the trade in Economy II was
also reduced we saw no improvements in the welfare. However, this could be attributed
to the fact that the income from the transaction tax was lost and with a more efficient
government one would expect positive welfare effects.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper we studied the impact of a financial transactions tax on the volatility of asset
prices and the welfare in the economy. The model is able to replicate some important
empirical facts such as that the introduction of a transaction tax reduces the trading
volume but increases the asset-price volatility. In addition, the welfare in the economy
also increases.
The model in this paper can be extended into several directions. First, the model in
this paper has only one stock market. In the presence of several stock markets one would
be able to study the migration of traders from a financial market with a transaction tax
towards a stock market without a financial transaction tax. This is an issue for smaller
financial centres. For example Umlauf (1993) discusses the experience of the swedish
stock market where a large fraction of the trade in stocks migrated to London. In addi-
tion, there might be potential spill-over effects from introducing a financial transaction
tax on only one market.
Furthermore, the model presented in this paper is a pure asset-pricing model and the
connection between the financial side of the economy and the real side of the economy
is not explored here, in particular the effect of a transaction tax on business cycles.
Studying the implying of a financial transaction on the business cycle would also provide
another fruitful direction of research.
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